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The aim of this paper is to investigate the impact of the issuer-underwriter
relationship on the price performance of IPOs in the Turkish market. IPOs by related
underwriters are found to exhibit higher levels of underpricing. Empirical evidence does
not lend support for the certification effect. The outcome of higher underpricing may be
due to deliberate underpricing by the related underwriter in order to make subsequent IPOs
by the same group more attractive or may have to do with market recognition of potential
conflict of interest.
The pricing behavior of initial public offerings (IPOs) has attracted widespread
research attention both in developed and emerging markets. Explanations for the widely
documented IPO underpricing phenomenon differ according to firm characteristics, market
regulations and other contextual factors. Different factors are found to affect the magnitude
and causes of underpricing across both developed and emerging markets. The main
purpose of this paper is to investigate the impact of the issuer-underwriter relationship on
the price performance of IPOs in one of the emerging market settings, namely Turkey.
Emerging markets are characterized by severe agency and information asymmetry problems
stemming from ineffective regulatory environment, weak minority shareholder protection.
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and the domination of family business groups (Sullivan and Unite, 2001). In a typical
emerging market, financial institutions and regulatory framework are newly developing and
market participants are relatively less experienced. The Turkish market resembles other
emerging markets in many respects. Continual changes in regulations, information
asymmetry issues, agency problems, and family control also prevail in the Turkish context
(Guner et al.; 2000; Muradoglu, 2000; Yurtoglu, 2001). Thus, this setting presents itself as
a valuable ground to investigate the role of the issuer-underwriter relationship in the IPO
price performance.
Similar to previous empirical findings in the Turkish market (Guner et al; 2000;
Kiymaz, 2000), persistent abnormal returns are also detected in this study. Differential IPO
underpricing across related and unrelated IPOs may be due the certification effect and
conflict of interest. When the issuer and the underwriter are related, the inherent
information advantage might lead to a better certification and/or conflict of interest
problem, all of which may have different effects on underpricing. Reputational concerns
play a pivotal role in determining which effect will dominate. Evidence indicates greater
underpricing when the underwriter and the issuer belong to the same group. Related IPOs
are found to belong to larger issuing companies, involving greater amounts of proceeds and
higher percentages of equity offered. The presence of greater underpricing in related issues
does not lend support for the certification explanation of underpricing. When the IPOs are
reclassified according to the lead imderwriter’s involvement with the related issue,
significant differences are not observed among the abnormal returns in IPOs by different
groups of underwriters. However, the highest abnormal returns belong to IPOs by
underwriters conducting only-related issues.
In IPOs by underwriters engaging in both related and unrelated issues, defined here
as the mixed group, related issues are found to exhibit significantly greater underpricing
than that in unrelated issues. This further suggests the irrelevance of the certification effect
in the Turkish context. However, this does not necessarily lend direct evidence for the
conflict of interest explanation, as this effect largely depends on the market’s ability to
capture it. If such a conflict of interest is recognized by market participants, underpricing
may occur in the form of additional compensation demanded by investors. This study raises
an alternative explanation which warrants further investigation of group-driven motives for
such an occurrence. When the lead underwriter and the issuer belong to the same group of
companies, underpricing might be viewed as a mechanism through which prospective
investors are enticed to participate in subsequent offers by the same group.

Previous Studies
Empirical evidence from numerous studies on IPO’s suggests the presence of three
distinct patterns of price behavior in developed markets: initial underpricing, cycles in the
extent of underpricing, and long-run underperformance (Ritter, 2002). Initial underpricing
of IPOs is also widely documented in various emerging market settings (Loughran et al;
1995) including the Turkish market (Kiymaz, 2000; Guner et al; 2000). Another pattern
observed in emerging markets is that underpricing exhibits a decreasing trend as financial
markets evolve (Su and Fleisher, 1999).
Despite a general consensus on the presence of price patterns in the extant
literature, different explanations and theoretical perspectives are presented. An important
vein of explanations focuses on the information asymmetry argument. This explanation
seems to gain more importance in emerging markets, where contextual characteristics
contribute to the information asymmetries besides the usual IPO-inherent asymmetries.
The existence of informational asymmetry between informed and uninformed
investors (Rock, 1986), and between underwriters and issuers (Baron, 1982) are initially put
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forth as explanations for the well-documented abnormal return phenomenon. In the case of
informational asymmetry between underwriters and issuers, the issuer’s inability to
perfectly monitor the underwriters’ distribution efforts is claimed to result in greater
underpricing. However, Muscarella and Vetsuypens (1989) fail to lend supportive
evidence to this hypothesis. In their study of self-marketed offerings, where information
asymmetry is presumed to be absent, they still document significant underpricing.
As an alternative explanation, third party certification is suggested to reduce
underpricing by decreasing any ex-ante uncertainty about the firm value. If the
underwriters inappropriately reduce the offer price by a considerable amount, they are likely
to be punished by subsequent losses in market share (Dunbar, 1999). Such reputational
concerns are claimed to produce a sufficient incentive to more fairly price the firm.
Supportingly, venture capital backing (Megginson and Weiss, 1991; Brav and Gompers,
1997) and the existence of a banking relationship (James and Wier, 1990) are found to
lower the extent of underpricing, largely due to the certification effect. However, the
certification effect, which might reduce informational asymmetry between insiders and
outside investors, becomes blurred when there is a potential conflict of interest between the
certifying party and the issuer (Hamao et al; 2000). They point out that if outside investors
perceive a potential conflict of interest, they would demand more underpricing as
compensation. However, reputational concerns may alleviate this effect and a conflict of
interest might not influence that much underpricing. How the market reacts to the combined
effect of certification and conflict of interest would seem to determine the final outcome.
While conflicts of interests do not seem to affect IPO pricing in the U.S. as reputational
concerns dominate (Gompers and Lemer, 1999), the evidence on Japanese markets (Hamao
et al; 2000) and on Philippines markets (Sullivan and Unite, 2001) indicate that the problem
of conflicts of interest is taken as more relevant by market participants and this leads to
greater underpricing.
The interaction between certification and conflict of interest becomes operational
when the underwriter and the issuer are affiliated. In the presence of affiliation, the lead
underwriter might have the incentive to market the issue more aggressively and to overstate
the stock value (Hamao et al; 2000), leading to lower underpricing. On the other hand, Puri
(1999) suggests that private information obtained through affiliation might have two
opposing effects. First, it might cause a conflict of interest such that the underwriter may
misrepresent the value of the issuing firm. Second, better pricing might be ensured as the
underwriter certifies the firm value more accurately.
Affiliation is also said to exist when a venture capitalist who holds financial claims
in the issuing firm’s assets acts as the lead underwriter. However, empirical evidence is
mixed on this issue. In the U.S. market, Megginson and Weiss (1991) report lower
underpricing in IPOs where the venture capitalist is also the underwriter. They argue that
lower initial returns can be taken as a sign of increased certification and reduction of
information asymmetry between inside and outside investors. However, in Japanese and
Philippine IPO markets, higher underpricing is documented in venture-backed IPOs
(Hamao et al; 2000; Sullivan and Unite 2001) as market participants demand more
underpricing to compensate for the perceived conflict of interest.

The Turkish Market
The Istanbul Stock Exchange was legally established in 1981 with the enactment of
the Capital Market Law. However, it became operational in 1986. In time, the development
of the ISE became highly representative of an emerging market with rapid growth in terms
of market capitalization, trade volume, and number of listed companies as well as high
volatility in returns. At the beginning of 1986, 42 stocks were listed and the annual volume
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of trade was $13 million. The annual volume of trade topped $181.9 billion in 2000. Not
surprisingly, the market capitalization of the ISE grew fast. It increased from $0.9 billion at
year end 1986 to $114 billion by the end of 1999, before declining to $69.5 billion by the
end of 2000. Developments in the ISE are presented in Table I.
Different amendments to the Capital Market Law since 1981 contributed to the
development of regulations and procedures governing the IPO market in Turkey. Currently,
the first stage of the IPO process starts with the registration of the prospective issuing
company with the Capital Market Board (CMB), which is the regulatory institution for the
financial markets in Turkey. The main focus at the registration stage is on assuring that
adequate and non-misleading information is provided to the public. It should be noted that
the CMB does not authorize but only permits prospective issuers to proceed with the IPO,
ascertaining that all of the documents required by the related legislation are disclosed fully
and correctly. All financial statements submitted to the CMB for registration must be
approved by certified independent auditors. In the following stage, the prospective issuer
has to sign a contract of intermediation with one or more of the underwriting firms
authorized by the CMB. Both auditors and intermediary institutions can still be held legally
responsible for their failure in providing fair and non-misleading information.
The CMB also sets the ground rules for the underwriting and sales procedures.
Underwriting can be on the basis of either best-efforts or firm commitment. The latter may
be designed as either a stand-by agreement or a full commitment agreement. Under the
stand-by arrangement, the underwriter is obligated to assume in full and cash all unsold
shares at the end of the selling process, while full commitment requires full payment for all
the shares right before the selling process starts. In regard to capital adequacy, the CMB
imposes certain restrictions on the amount that a given intermediary institution can
underwrite. Financial responsibility from previous issues continues until all underwriting
requirements are fullfilled by the underwriter. This illustrates the importance of the previous
experience and reputation of the underwriter embedded in the IPO process. If the
underwriting is carried out by a syndicate, the intermediary institution designated as the lead
underwriter assumes all responsibility of the issue against all related governmental agencies
including the CMB, the issuer, and the third parties.
The development of the IPO market in Turkey is presented in Table n. Since the
inception of the EPO market in Turkey, 261 IPOs have been completed, generating total
proceeds of over 6.3 billion U.S. dollars. There is no apparent time pattern in the IPOs,
both in terms of the number of IPOs and the proceeds. The market has displayed an erratic
pattern. 1990 and 2000 have been the most active years for IPOs. It may be noted that the
large volume of IPOs in 1990 was mainly due to large scale privatization sales in that year.
The activity in 2000 was largely due to the overoptimism prevailing in the economy in that
period. However, the overoptimism of 2000 was reversed by the economic crisis of 2001,
which can be noticed easily as only two IPOs took place between January 2001 and July
2002.

Data and Methodology
The data includes all the IPOs since the start of the IPO market in Turkey, covering
the period from January 1990 to July 2002. Excluding two IPOs by two soccer clubs\ the
remaining total number of IPOs during this period is 259. The data on daily stock prices.

^Two prominent but heavily indebted soccer teams rely on IPO as they realize club membership loyalty
would override lack of economic attractiveness.
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market index values, all firm and issue characteristics regarding the offers are obtained from
the electronic database of the ISE.^
Initial price performance is measured by calculating three return figures. The first is
the first-day raw return (RRl), calculated as the percentage difference between the offer
price and the first day closing price. Second, market-adjusted rates of return are calculated
by subtracting the return on the ISE index from that on the stock on the first (ARl), second
(AR2), third (AR3) and fourth (AR4) day of trading after the offer. Third, these marketadjusted returns are cumulated to the end of the third, seventh and tenth day of trading to get
the cumulative rates of return CAR3, CAR7 and CAR 10, respectively.
The other variables used in the study are denoted and defined as AGE (the age of the
issuing firm at the time of the IPO, expressed in years since the establishment), SIZE (the
pre-IPO market value of the company), OFFPER (the percentage of total equity offered to
the public), PROCEEDS (the number of shares sold times the offer price), LEADEX (the
number of previous IPOs by the lead underwriter), LEADEXD (the total dollar value of
previous IPOs by the lead underwriter), and UNDNUMBER (the number of underwriters
participating in the IPO).
The relationship between the issuer and the underwriter is defined and explored in
two dimensions. First, an EPO is designated as a related issue when the issuer and the
underwriter belong to the same group of companies. In these cases, comparisons are made
across related and unrelated issue categories. Second, underwriters are classifed into three
groups depending on the relatedness to the IPOs they conduct. The first group (the mixed
group) contains those underwriting both related and unrelated issues. The second group and
the third group contain those underwriting only related issues {only-related group) and
those dealing with only unrelated issues {only-unrelated group), respectively. Comparisons
are then made among these three groups.

Empirical Findings
A first-step examination of the empirical evidence on the Turkish EPO market
demonstrates that the initial price performance is similar to that in both developed and
other emerging markets. Table HI reports the average initial return performance of the IPO
market in Turkey. Statistically significant abnormal returns, which are observed during the
first two days, indicate the presence of underpricing. Daily abnormal returns beyond the
second day are not statistically different fi*om zero. The most pronounced daily return is
observed in the first day and exceeds 11%, with and without market adjustment. The
cumulative abnormal return reaches to 16.2% on the third day, increases to 20.4% on the
seventh day, and levels off thereafter.
Before analyzing in detail the differences in price performance of IPOs by different
categories of underwiters, some basic characteristics of related and unrelated issues are
initially compared and the results are reported in Table IV. Although the average age (AGE)
of the issuing companies of IPOs by related underwriters (14.77 years) is lower than that by
unrelated underwriters (17.62), the difference is not statistically significant. Similarly, the
differences between related and unrelated underwriters with respect to the number of
underwriters in the syndicate (UNDNUMBER) and also with respect to the previous IPO
value underwritten (LEADEXD) are not statistically significant. Unrelated underwriters,
however, seem to have underwritten more IPOs in the past (LEADEX) than related
underwriters. More importantly, both the average company value going public (SIZE) and
also the percentage of equity offered to the public (OFFPER) via related underwriters are
statistically significantly greater than those via unrelated underwriters. The average SIZE
’Available at www.imkb.gov.tr.
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figures are $418m and $90m for related and unrelated issues, respectively. The two findings
directly imply the PROCEEDS with related underwriters is significantly greater than that
with unrelated underwriters. Furthermore, related underwriters seem to generate these
greater volumes with a smaller number of underwriters in the syndicate (LEADEX) than
unrelated underwriters.
The above findings suggest that related underwriters engage in the IPOs of larger
companies with greater amounts of proceeds and a higher percentage of equity offered.
Dealing with larger sized companies may imply an extra incentive (for example, higher
underwriting revenues) for the related underwriter to process more information. Moreover,
the existence of a equity relationship may mitigate any problems associated with
information asymmetries between the underwriter and the issuer. Both of these factors
would seem to imply a lower overall underpricing in IPOs conducted by related
underwriters, provided that the information advantage leads to better certification. However,
it should be noted that this information advantage can also be used against the interests of
outside investors, who in turn may require extra compensation for this conflict of interest.
Whether certification or conflict of interest is in effect is thus an empirical issue. If
reputational concerns dominate, underpricing may be expected to be lower. On the other
hand, if the conflict of interest problem is deemed to be more important, higher
underpricing may be expected. The answer would then depend on the perceptions of the
market participants. Another cause for underpricing might be due to strategic behavior by
the lead underwriter. Such a pricing strategy may occur in both related and unrelated issues.
However, it is possibly more pronounced when the imderwriter and the issuer belong to the
same group of companies. In such a setting, in addition to possible reputational concerns of
the underwriter, group-driven factors might also be in effect. Such factors might result in
deliberate underpricing, especially in earlier IPOs of the group. Making other group
company subsequent offers more attractive and reallocating cash flow within the group can
be mentioned as possible internally driven motives for such behavior.
To investigate the impact of the issuer-underwriter relationship on abnormal returns,
different analyses are conducted for different subsamples of relatedness. Differences in
abnormal returns between the IPOs by related and unrelated issues are initially examined
and the results are reported in Table V. Both the average raw return and the average
abnormal return during the first day after the IPOs by related underwriters are significantly
greater than those by unrelated underwriters. Specifically, the first day average market
adjusted return for related IPOs isl8.15%, while it is 8.70% for unrelated IPOs. However,
beyond the first day of trading, no significant differences can be seen in either daily or
cumulative abnormal returns. The higher underpricing in related issues is interestingly
noticable only in the first day of trading after the offering.
Higher underpricing in the presence of an equity relationship between the
underwriter and the issuer seems to undermine the relevance of the certification and the
reduced informational asymmetry explanations of underpricing. Therefore, these results
might be attributable to the conflict of interest and/or strategic pricing explanations
mentioned above.
To investigate the presence of strategic pricmg in IPOs by related underwriters, a
series of comparisons are made between different underwriter categories. When
underwriters are classified into mixed, only-related and only-unrelated groups, underpricing
is expected to differ across IPOs by these groups of underwriters. Especially, if groupdriven factors are in effect, the highest underpricing is anticipated for IPOs by the onlyrelated group of underwriters. Table VI displays the empirical differences in the average
returns between the three groups of underwriters. Although average underpricing on the
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first day of trading for the only-related-group is in the anticipated direction and magnitude,
differences between the three groups are not statistically significant.
The case of the mixed group, which involves both related and unrelated issues by
the same underwriter, may help clarify any possible motives of underpricing. Underwriters
in the mixed group may have both internally and externally motivated intentions. For
example, differential underpricing between related and unrelated issues by the same
underwriter would suggest the presence of group-driven motives. According to a strategic
pricing argument, underpricing is expected to be greater in related issues belonging to the
mixed group. Of the 183 IPOs conducted by the mixed-group of underwriters, 48 belong to
companies within the same group. Considering both raw and market adjusted returns in
Table VII, the average first-day return is around 17% for related issues, while it is around
7% for unrelated issues and the difference is statistically significant. This finding is
consistent with the strategic pricing argument. However, it should be noted that this
difference may also be due to the learning effect in that underwriters could gain experience
through time. To control for this learning effect, differences in the time of offering between
related and unrelated EPOs are investigated and no significant differences are found in the
timing of the two different groups. Specifically, related and unrelated issues do not
significantly differ in terms of both calendar ranking and the year of issue. Finally, beyond
the initial trading day, no further evidence of different pricing behavior is observed between
related and unrelated issues by the mixed-group of underwriters.
It can be argued that if underwriters use underpricing as a means to generate further
future demand for companies within the same group, the degree of underpricing may be
expected to decline in subsequent offers. To check for this eventuality, the related issues,
which represent about 25% of the total sample, are regrouped in order of occurrence in
time. As the empirical evidence in Table VIII suggests, the extent of underpricing actually
declines in time, albeit to a statistically insignificant degree. Nevertheless, the average
abnormal return of the first related issue is 27.2%, which drops to 16.9% in the second
offer, and then to 9.1% in the third and subsequent offers. If this trend is to continue into the
future, statistical significance may also be eventually seen.

Conclusions
This study provided new evidence of the underpricing of initial public offerings and
investigated its possible causes in the Turkish equity markets, where a pattern of significant
daily abnormal returns for the first two days of trading is observed. However, the extent of
underpricing seems to depend on the relationship between the underwriter and the issuer.
IPOS’s by related underwriters are significantly more underpriced than the others. When
this finding is further detailed in line with the “conflict of interest” and “certification effect”
arguments in the literature, both similarities and also differences are found between the
Turkish markets and other markets of the world. The conflict of interest argument seems to
be supported, while the presence of any certification effect is not clear.
In future work, it would be interesting to continue this research topic in two
dimensions. The nature of any association between the underwriter and the issues may be
set up with more detail. Second, a comparative international study based on the same
assumed structure of relationship details may provide a common explanation for all of the
countries.
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Table I
The Development of the ISE

Volume o f Trade
Year
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000

Total
U SD M illion
13
118
115
773
5,854
8,502
8,567
21,771
23,203
52,357
37,737
58,104
70,396
84,034
181,934

Daily Average
USD M illion
0.05
0.47
0.45
3.03
23.70
34.42
34.13
88.50
91.71
208.59
152.78
230.57
283.85
356.08
739.57

Total Market
Capitalization
USD M illion
938
3,125
1,128
6,756
18,737
15,564
9,922
37,824
21,785
20,782
30,797
61,879
33,975
114,271
69,507

Annual
Rate o f
Return
% TL
71
294
-44
493
47
34
-8
417
32
47
144
254
-25
485
-38

Table II
Size of the Turkish IPO Market
Num ber o f IPO s
Proceeds
#
%
(1,000 USD)
%
1990
34
13.13
1,308,572
20.73
21
1991
8.11
343,979
5.45
1992
13
5.02
93,153
1.48
1993
16
6.18
152,447
2.41
1994
25
9.65
270,480
4.28
1995
28
10.81
245,85
3.89
1996
27
10.42
167,922
2.66
1997
29
419,802
11.20
6.65
1998
20
404,744
6.41
7.72
1999
9
87,413
1.38
3.47
2000
35
2,800,805
44.36
13.51
2001
243
0.00
1
0.39
2002*
0.30
1
18,783
0.39
6,313,626 100.00
Total
259
100.00
* As of July 2002, excluding two IPOs by soccer clubs.
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Table III
Initial Return Statistics

Mean
Std.Error
t -value
Sig.
RRl
11.01
1.59
6.89
0.000
ARl
11.04
1.58
6.99
0.000
AR2
3.57
1.03
1.03
0.001
AR3
0.88
0.59
1.50
0.135
AR4
0.76
0.40
1.88
0.061
CARS
16.24
2.12
7.65
0.000
CAR7
20.43
3.14
6.52
0.000
CARIO
20.19
3.31
6.11
0.000
RRl indicates raw return on the first day of trading. ARl represents
market-adjusted return on the first day of trading. AR2, AR3 and
AR4 are market adjusted retums on days two, three and four,
respectively. CARS, CAR7 and CAR 10 denote cumulative marketadjusted retums at the end of the third, seventh and tenth day of
trading, respectively.

Table IV
Differences in IPO Characteristics: Related - Unrelated Issues
R elated Issues
Unrelated Issues
(n=64)
(n=195)
Mean
Variables
Mean
F-statistic Sig.
AGE (year)
14.77
17.62
2.21
0.138
ISlZK ($ thousand)
418,080
90,687
4.50
0.035
OFFPER (%)
29.40
23.27
0.024
5.17
PROCEEDS(($ thousand)
51,026
15,631
4.57
0.033
LEADEX (number)
6.27
8.59
4.01
0.046
LEADEXD ($ thousand)
165,697
172,050
0.03
0.863
UNDNUM BER (number)
3.45
4.53
0.07
0.798
AGE: age of the issuing firm at the time of t le IPO; SIZE: pre-IPO market value of
the company; OFFPER: percentage of total equity offered to the public;
PROCEEDS: number of shares sold times the offer price; LEADEX: number of
previous IPOs by the lead underwriter; LEADEXD: total dollar value of previous
IPOs by the lead underwriter; UNDNUMBER: number of underwriters participating
in the IPO.
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Table V
Differences in Abnormal Returns: Related

Unrelated Issues

R elated Issues U nrelated Issues
(n=64)
(n=195)
F-statistic
Mean
Mean
Variables
Sig.
0.014
6.07
8.77
RRl
17.78
0.009
6.85
18.15
8.70
ARl
0.321
0.99
AR2
1.78
4.16
0.603
0.27
1.06
AR3
0.35
0.203
1.63
14.69
CAR3
20.95
0.479
0.50
24.31
19.16
CAR7
0.362
0.83
18.46
CARIO
25.45
RRl indicates raw return on the first day of trading. ARl represents marketadjusted return on the first day of trading. AR2, AR3 and AR4 are market
adjusted retums on days two, three and four, respectively. CAR3, CAR? and
CARIO denote cumulative market-adjusted retums at the end of the third,
seventh and tenth day of trading, respectively.

Table VI
Differences in Abnormal Returns across Different Groups of
Underwriters
IPOs by Underwriters
Mixed Group Only Related Group Only Unrelated Group
(n=15)
(n=55)
(n=183)
Mean
Mean
Mean
F-value
Sig.
9.?5
22.81
11.19
1.68
0.188
RRl
22.98
9.71
11.40
1.79
0.169
ARl
2.98
0.16
0.64
AR2
2.39
0.528
-2.96
1.22
1.09
1.23
0.294
AR3
19.50
14.91
14.52
0.15
CAR3
0.859
19.60
16.95
17.63
0.05
0.952
CAR?
0.24
19.86
23.86
15.13
CARIO
0.786
RRl indicates raw retum on the first day of trading. ARl represents market-adjusted retum on the
first day of trading. AR2, AR3 and AR4 are market adjusted retums on days two, three and four
respectively. CAR3, CAR? and CARIO denote cumulative market-adjusted retums at the end o f the
third, seventh and tenth day of trading, respectively.
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Table VII
Differences in Abnormal Returns within the Mixed Group
IPOs by Mixed Group
Related Issues
Unrelated Issues
(n=48)
(n=135)
Mean
Mean
F-value
RRl
16.64
7.30
5.92
0.016
ARl
16.98
7.12
6.93
0.009
AR2
2.06
3.30
0.56
0.455
AR3
1.03
1.11
0.00
0.959
CAR3
21.01
12.73
2.59
0.109
CAR7
25.18
17.61
0.91
0.341
CARIO
25.09
17.99
0.394
0.73
RRl indicates raw return on the first day of trading. ARl represents marketadjusted return on the first day of trading. AR2, AR3 and AR4 are market
adjusted returns on days two, three and four, respectively. CAR3, CAR7 and
CARIO denote cumulative market-adjusted returns at the end of the third,
seventh and tenth day of trading, respectively.

Table VHI
Differences in Abnormal Returns in Related Issues
First related Second related Third or more related
(n=26)
(n=15)
(n=23)
Mean
Mean
F-value
Mean
Sig.
0.224
RRl
26.86
16.39
1.53
8.99
ARl
27.19
16.92
1.66
9.13
0.199
2.72
0.72
AR2
0.31
0.735
0.93
0.53
0.591
AR3
0.50
1.46
-1.05
0.121
CAR3
31.11
20.28
9.10
2.19
32.09
8.41
0.164
CAR7
32.19
1.86
31.84
41.57
7.41
2.17
0.123
CARIO
RRl indicates raw return on the first day of trading. ARl represents market-adjusted return on the
first day of trading. AR2, AR3 and AR4 are market adjusted returns on days two, three and four,
respectively. CAR3, CAR7 and CARIO denote cumulative market-adjusted returns at the end of the
third, seventh and tenth day of trading, respectively.

